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Divorces Obtained Abroad By American Domiciliaries
Recognition in the United States
I. MIGRATORY DIVORCES IN GENERAL
The jurisdictional basis for a divorce decree in the United States
is domicile. The divorcing party must establish domicile in the ren-
dering forum or the decree will be void for want of jurisdiction,' and
may be collaterally attacked in another forum,' the second forum
applying its own domiciliary concepts.4 Thus, when a spouse leaves
his home forum and obtains a migratory divorce in another juris-
diction, the domicile issue necessarily underlies any later attack. The
judgments of a sister-state and those of a foreign country must be
considered separately; the sister-state judgments being recognized on
the basis of full faith and credit' and those of a foreign country on
the basis of comity.!
The two cases of Williams v. North Carolina' established the mod-
ern approach to recognition of sister-state divorces. Since valid sister-
state judgments are to be accorded full faith and credit, the first
Williams case' held that an ex parte divorce obtained in the domicil-
iary state of the divorcing spouse must be recognized by the review-
ing forum; under the second Williams decision,' the reviewing forum
may determine whether or not there was a bona fide acquisition of
' EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 239 (1962); Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1951);
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1955). For
purposes of this discussion, the requisite of domicile may be considered to be physical presence
(although not necessarily continuous) and intent to remain indefinitely within the state
claimed as the domicile. For further discussion see Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes are
Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 HARV. L. REv. 68 (1939). American courts had early
recognized that the spouses might acquire separate domicile to which the marital res was
taken: Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901). The decision of Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U.S. 562 (1906), however, caused confusion in the application of the domicile rule, the
Court holding that the guilty spouse (an abandoning husband) could not cause his later
acquired domicile to become the situs of the marital res; seemingly only the innocent spouse
could carry the marriage res. See Beale, Haddock Revisited, 39 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1926);
Holt, Any More Light on Haddock v. Haddock? The Problem of Domicile in Divorce, 39
MICH. L. REV. 689 (1941).
'Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 242 (1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 49 (4th ed. 1964); 27A C.J.S. Divorce §5 169c, 173 (1959).
aRice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1944);
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); 27B C.J.S. Divorce 5§ 356, 358 (1959).
'Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAwS 26
(4th ed. 1964).
'U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; EHRENZWEIGN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 47, 166 (1962); 16
AM. JUR. Constitutional Law § 585 (1938).
6 See infra note 14.
'325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 US. 287 (1942)
'Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
domicile. These decisions represented a "shift from matrimonial domi-
cile to domicile in fact of one of the spouses.""0 The United States
Supreme Court subsequently determined in Sherrer v. Sherrer5 that
when the jurisdictional fact of domicile had already been litigated the
doctrine of res judicata precluded the defendant who appeared in the
divorce proceeding from collaterally attacking the judgment. In
Coe v. Coe1" res judicata again precluded the defendant spouse from
attacking the bona fides of the domicile where the defendant had ap-
peared in the suit, but had failed to raise the jurisdictional issue. Be-
cause of the full faith and credit requirement, Johnson v. Muelberger a
held that if the law of the divorcing forum precluded a third party
from collaterally attacking a decree obtained by both parties to the
divorce, the law of the divorcing forum controlled.
Judgments of foreign countries (hereinafter referred to as foreign
judgments, as distinct from sister-state judgments) are recognized
on the basis of comity."4 Comity, however, need not be extended to
the foreign judgment. The reviewing court may consider the judg-
ment violative of the reviewing forum's public policy.' State courts
did not begin to deal with the problem of the migratory divorce,
either foreign or domestic, until the 1930's."e The earliest decisions
'eStumberg, The Migratory Divorce, 33 WASH. L. REV. 331, 334 (1958).
" Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
"I334 U.S. 378 (1948).
13340 U.S. 581 (1951).
" Although comity is "a word of loose and uncertain meaning at best" (Reese, The
Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 784
(1950)), it may be synthesized as a court's voluntary recognition of another country's judi-
cial decree, on the basis of courtesy or mutual convenience. See also Bobala v. Bobala, 68
Ohio App. 63, 71, 33 N.E.2d 845, 849 (1940); BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 334 (4th ed.
1951); 16 AM. JuR. Conflict of Laws, § 5 (1938); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 192
(1962); 16 AM. JUR. Conflict of Laws, §§ 4-7 (1938); 15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, § 3
(1939); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 973 (1933); Annot., 50 A.L.R. 30 (1927).
" Public policy was defined in In re Fleischer's Estate, 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d 543,
547 (1948) as "the laws of the state, whether found in the Constitution, the statutes or
judicial records." See also Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955);
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 202 (1962); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judg-
ments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1950); Note, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 328
(1965); Note, 21 ALBANY L. REV. 64 (1957); 16 AM. JuR. Conflict of Laws § 6 (1938).
'6 In 1935, Duke University published a series of articles dealing with the problem of
migratory divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMI'. PROB. 289-400 (1935), the Foreward to which
reads:
With the nation's attention absorbed since 1929 by the stress of economic de-
pression and the measures designed to combat it, the pronounced increase in
volume of migratory divorce for which the facilitating legislation in Nevada,
Arkansas, Idaho, and lately Florida, stands responsible, has aroused no or-
ganized protest. Even the Mexican "mail order" divorce business has until re-
cently stimulated no efforts at restriction.
It was not until the late 1920's that a few state legislatures reduced their residence re-
quirements and thereby facilitated the so-called "quickie" divorce. See Stumberg, The Mi-
gratory Divorce, 33 WASH. L. REV. 331, 334 (1958). Today the following states have a
six weeks' residence requirement: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1 (1957); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-701
(1947); Nuv. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1957). Arkansas and Wyoming have a sixty-day re-
quirement, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1208 (1962); WYO; STAT. ANN. § 20-48 (1957).
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concerned migratory divorce decrees rendered by foreign countries.
At this time, however, the courts did not yet have the Sherrer7 and
Coe" line of cases as a juridical frame of reference.19
II. THE FOREIGN MIGRATORY DIVORCE
The divorces granted by a foreign country may be put into four
classifications:"0 (1) A divorce decree based on the divorcing spouse's
bona fide domicile in the divorcing forum; (2) the mail order divorce;
(3) the ex parte divorce; and (4) the bilaterial divorce.
Before discussing these various classifications of decrees it should
be noted that even where a divorce decree might otherwise be held
invalid, the theory of estoppel may apply."' This is true not only with
respect to the various categories of foreign-acquired decrees, but also
with respect to those acquired in a sister state."2
A. Divorce Based On Bona Fide Domicile
If a bona fide domicile has been established in the divorcing forum,
" Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
18 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
19 When the state courts in the 1930's began to review the foreign divorce decrees, they
did so by applying the jurisdictional standards and judicial thinking of the times. Had
Sherrer and Coe already been determined, the courts would at least have had available the
doctrines which these cases formulated.
so There seems to be several approaches to the categorical breakdown of Mexican divorces.
In Note, 17 S.C.L. REV. 625 (1965) the decrees are broken down into three categories: mail-
order decree, ex parte decree, and bilateral divorce decree; Note, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 449
(1965) seems to deal with the problem along the lines of division into three categories;
Note, 45 MAss. L.Q. No. 3142 (1960) lists five categories of decrees: mail-order decree;
the decree given where the plaintiff personally appears and the defendant is personally
served within the Mexican jurisdiction; the decree where the plaintiff appears personally
and the defendant by attorney; the decree issued where the defendant appears personally
and plaintiff appears by Mexican attorney; and finally, the ex parte decree; and in Note 21
ALBANY L. REv. 64, 73 (1957) four categories are considered: mail-order decrees; decrees
where both parties were physically present; decrees where one party was physically present
and one was present by attorney; and ex parte decrees.
" The equitable principle of estoppel will apply to preclude the divorcing spouse from
later attacking the divorce. Estoppel applied to ex pare divorces: Dunn v. Tiernan, 284
S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App 1955) error ref. n.r.e., though it is not altogether clear whether
the Texas court would hold the bilateral foreign decree invalid; Spellens v. Spellens, 49
Cal.2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957). Estoppel applied to mail order divorces: Sears v. Sears,
293 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Schotte v. Schotte, 21 Cal. Rep. 2d 220 (1962); Hensgen
v. Silberman, 87 Cal. App. 2d 668, 197 P.2d 356 (1948); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App.
2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945); Considine v. Rawl, 39 Misc. 2d 1021, 242 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1963); Weber v. Weber, 135 Misc. 717, 238 N.Y.S. 333 (1929). New York, however,
will not permit estoppel to be applied to a mail order decree where the parties are simply
seeking to have the marital status adjudicated and are not seeking property or other enrich-
ment, Dorn v. Dorn, 122 Misc. 1057, 112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1952), aff'd, 282 App. Div. 597,
126 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953); Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1941).
22Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PeoB. 335 (1935);
Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 158 (1930); Stumberg, The
Migratory Divorce, 33 WAsH L. REv. 331 (1958).
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the divorce will generally be recognized as valid.' The burden is on
the attacking party to defeat the allegation of jurisdiction." Cali-
fornia statutorily makes the burden of proving lack of domicile more
difficult if the foreign decree recites that a bona fide domicile was
established.25 But, due to the fact that California also has the Uni-
form Divorce Recognition Act,"5 the divorcing spouse will not have
the advantage of this provision if he resided in California immediate-
ly before or after the decree.
B. Mail Order Divorce
The mail order divorce decree is obtained completely by corre-
spondence-neither spouse appearing before the foreign court, either
personally or by attorney."' No state will recognize the mail order
decrees; they are considered violations of state public policy."5
'Scott v. Scott, 51 Cal. Rep. 2d 249, 331 P.2d 641 (1958); De Young v. De Young,
27 Cal. Rep. 2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950); Kapigan v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. Rep. 412, 99
N.E. 264 (1912).
24 Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App.2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1935); Davis v. Davis, 156
N.E.2d 494 (Ohio 1959); Thompson v. Yarnell, 313 Pa. 244, 169 A. 370 (1933).
25 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1915 (1959):
A final judgment of any other tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdic-
tion according to the laws of such country to pronounce the judgment, shall
have the same effect as in the country where rendered, and also the same effect
as final judgments rendered in this State.
See also De Young v. De Young, 27 Cal. Rep. 2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946); Ryder v.
Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1935); Galloway v. Galloway, 116 Cal. App.
2d 478 (1931).
"CAL. Civ. CODE, §§ 150-1-150.2 (1959):
150.1 A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or
effect in this State, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this State
at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.
150.2 Proof that a person hereafter obtaining a divorce from the bonds of
matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this State within
twelve months prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and
resumed residence in this State within eighteen months after the date of his
departure from this State and until his return maintained a place of residence
within this State, shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled
in this State when the divorce proceeding was commenced.
27 Although a foreign lawyer may handle the details within the divorcing forum, this
is not tantamount to an appearance by either party.
"SSears v. Sears, 293 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1961); U.S. v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Sherman v. Fed. Sec. Agency, 166 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1948); Muir v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Petition of R, 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944);
Petition of Taffel, 49 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Rudnick v. Rudnick, 131 Cal.
Rep. 2d 227, 280 P.2d 96 (1955); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490
(1945); Kegley v. Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 60 P.2d 482 (1936); Bergeron v. Bergeron,
287 Mass. Rep. 524, 192 N.E. 86 (1934); State v. De Meo, 35 N.J. Super. 168, 113 A.2d
688 (1955), aff'd 20 N.J. Rep. 1, 118 A.2d 1 (1955); Antunes v. Antunes, 23 N.J.
Super. 150, 92 A.2d 653 (1952); State v. Najjar, 1 N.J. Super. 208, 63 A.2d 807 (1949);
Tonti v. Chadwick, I N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949); Greenspan v. Greenspan, 19 N.J.
Misc. 153, 18 A.2d 283 (1941); Busk v. Busk, 229 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1962); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948); Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47
N.E.2d 423 (1943); Vose v. Vose, 255 App. Div. 1012, 9 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1938), af'd, 280
N.Y. 779, 21 N.E.2d 616 (1939); Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 213, 50 N.E.2d 889
(1943); De Rosay v. De Rosay, 162 Pa. Super. 333, 57 A.2d 685 (1948).
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C. Ex Parte Divorce
When the divorcing spouse has failed, by the standards of the
reviewing forum, to establish a bona fide domicile within the foreign
forum and the defendant spouse has made no appearance in the
suit, either personally or by attorney, the decree is ex parte. Such
decrees violate the public policy of every state which has reviewed
them, and the courts uniformly refuse to recognize them as valid."9
D. The Bilateral Divorce
1. General Approaches
In the bilateral divorce both parties are before the court, either
personally" or one personally and the other by attorney," and at
least one of the parties has complied with the jurisdictional require-
ments of the foreign forum. Those few states (other than New York)
which have considered the issue have refused to recognize the bilater-
ally acquired foreign divorce." Since the reviewing forum in the
United States generally requires domicile as a jurisdictional basis for
divorce, recognition of a decree where the divorcing spouse was within
the rendering jurisdiction for only a day or so is considered to violate
the reviewing state's public policy;3 and some courts even consider
it to be a fraud on the foreign court.'
Although few states have directly passed on the issue of the bilat-
eral foreign divorce decree, nine states' have adopted the Uniform
" Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1954); Hodge v. Hodge, 80 F. Supp.
379 (D.D.C. 1948); Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935); Bethune v. Bethune,
192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936); Sohnlein v. Winchell, 41 Cal. Rep. 145 (1964);
Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355, 214 N.W. 536 (1927); Untermann v. Untermann,
35 N.J. Super. 354, 114 A.2d 311 (1955), modified and aff'd, 19 N.J. 507, 117 A.2d
599 (1955); Reik v. Reik, 112 N.J. Eq. 234, 163 A. 907 (1933); Newton v. Newton, 13
N.J. Misc. 613, 179 A. 621 (1935); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d
902 (1955); Weisserberger v. Weisserberger, 206 Misc. 461, 133 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1954);
In re Andrew's Estate, 132 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1954); Kirk v. Kirk, 238 P.2d 808 (Okla.
1951); Allison v. Allison, 151 Pa. Super. 369, 30 A.2d 365 (1943); Turman v. Turman,
99 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 698 (1937), although here
the husband had fled from a Texas suit to Mexico and Texas had not relinquished its
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
3 0 Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (1963), aff'd, 42 N.J.
208, 200 A.2d 123 (1964); Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. Rep. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937).
31Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940).
32 See notes 30 and 31 supra.
3 Ibid.
a'Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. Rep. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937). This reasoning is also
applied to the divorce where there is lack of domicile (ex parte), e.g., Sohnlein v. Winchell,
41 Cal. Rep. 145 (1946); Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1938);
Galloway v. Galloway, 116 Cal. App. 478, 2 P.2d 842 (1931); the mail order decree
cases may also refer to fraud on the foreign court, e.g., Schotte v. Schotte, 21 Cal. Rep.
220 (1962).
3
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 150.1-150.2 (1959); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. 21-150 (Supp.
1963); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 42-303 (1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 458:19-a (Supp.
1955); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. 14-05-08.1 (1960); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12
(Supp. 1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-131-20-134 (1962); WASH REV. CODE ANN. 5
26.08.200 (1961), § 26.08.210 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.22 (1957).
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Divorce Recognition Act,"6 which establishes such presumptions of
domicile within the reviewing state as to impede a finding of juris-
diction in the foreign forum."7 The mere enactment of this statute
manifests disapproval of the bilateral foreign divorce.
Nonetheless, there appears to be a weakening of the domicile con-
cept as a whole in some states. In Wheat v. Wheat,"' the Supreme
Court of Arkansas upheld a statute which provides for a three months'
residency within the state as the jurisdictional basis for divorce. The
court clearly stated:
With respect to the due process clause, as distinguished from the full
faith and credit clause, we are not convinced that domicile must be
the sole basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over the marriage relation-
ship .... It has been pointed out repeatedly that the theory of basing
divorce jurisdiction solely on domicile has led to conflicting decisions
and to legal confusion ever since the theory was first formulated in
connection with the full faith and credit clause. Domicile differs from
residence only in the existence of a subjective intent to remain more or
less permanently in the particular state. Whether that intent exists on
the part of a person who comes to Arkansas can seldom be proved with
any measure of certainty. 9
Arkansas has continued to follow this line of reasoning," and one
decision has been found which gave full faith and credit to such an
Arkansas decision.41 Moreover, the Wheat case was used as the ration-
ale for upholding a divorce granted to a serviceman who had resided
in Arkansas for over three months.' And Alaska took the Wheat
approach in upholding its serviceman divorce statute." Eleven
states" have enacted a serviceman divorce statute, reducing the domi-
ciliary requirements for servicemen stationed in the respective juris-
diction. Decisions in some of these states have acknowledged the inad-
equacy of rigid domicile prerequisites in the particular situation. "
The effect of such statutes, however, is not altogether apparent,
especially in view of the fact that Nebraska and Rhode Island have
' UNIFORM DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT, 9A U.L.A. 461.
37 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
" 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).3 91d. at 797.
"Weaver v. Weaver, 231 Ark. 341, 329 S.W.2d 422 (1959).
" Cummiskey v. Cummiskey, 259 Minn. 427, 107 N.W.2d 864 (1961).
42Walther v. Walther, 233 Ark. 191, 343 S.W.2d 408 (1961).
" Lauterbeck v. Lauterbeck, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964).
44ALASKA STAT. 56-5-10 (Supp. 1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-15 (1958); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1603 (Supp. 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-341-42-344 (1943);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-18 (Supp. 1959); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1272 (1961); S.D. CODE § 14.0720 (1939); TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. art.
4631 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-97 (1950).
" Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M.
414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958); Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959).
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enacted both the Uniform Divorce Recognition Acte and a service-
man divorce statute.
As to the states which have not yet made a definitive finding on
the bilateral foreign divorce, decisions in at least two, Florida and
Texas, may indicate a willingness to recognize the bilaterally acquired
foreign divorce.4
2. The New York Approach
New York is on the other side of the decisional fence in regard
to the bilaterally obtained foreign divorce. As early as 1923, the New
York court of appeals, applying New York law, recognized a French-
granted divorce though neither of the spouses had established domi-
cile in France. Both parties had had substantial ties with the French
jurisdiction, but the court of appeals did not decide the case on this
ground. The decision appears to have established New York's policy
of recognizing a foreign divorce decree without requiring that the
divorcing spouse have acquired a domicile within the divorcing
46 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-34-42-344 (1943); R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 15-5-12 (1956).4
'NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-303 (1943); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-12 (1956). It
was recently stated in Note, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 121 (1964), that except for a shift in the
burden of proof, the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act in California has not brought
about a result different from any which would have been brought about by California law.
In view of the decisions of the state courts which have decided the issue of recognition
of Mexican decrees, this conclusion may be said to apply to the other states which have
enacted statutes similar to those of California.
" There seems to be a question as to the way the courts of Florida or Texas would rule
if they squarely faced the issue of the bilateral foreign divorce. In Willson v. Willson, 55
So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1952) where the husband obtained a Canadian divorce and the wife's at-
torney was present, the Florida court found that the Canadian court had jurisdiction (on
the grounds of domicile), yet the Florida court made the statement that: "As to matters
actually litigated this court has repeatedly approved he doctrine that a valid decree of a
foreign country will be recognized in this state." 55 So.2d 905, 906 (1952). What is a valid
decree is not made clear, nor did the Florida court qualify its statement by further requir-
ing domicile. In Dunn v. Tiernan, 284 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), error ref. n.r.e.
the Texas court relied on the doctrine of estoppel to uphold the validity of a Mexican
divorce. But found in the opinion is the following commentary:
Examination of the record reveals that appellant initiated the Juarez divorce
and persuaded appellee to enter her appearance through a Juarez attorney ...
Examination of the judgment itself shows that the Juarez court apparently
had full jurisdiction to render the decree that it did, and we think the trial
court was correct in holding appellant estopped from challenging the validity
of the Juarez decree. To have permitted him so to do would in effect permit
him to take advantage of his own fraud which he perpetrated on the Mexican
courts.
284 S.W.2d 754, 756 (1955). California, on the other hand, in ex parte cases where there
was no appearance (personal or by attorney of the defendant spouse), has stated that a
residence not acquired in good faith does not confer jurisdiction on the divorcing court. See
Kegley v. Kegley, 16 Cal. App. 2d 216, 60 P.2d 482 (1936); Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal.
App. 2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1935). Moreover, California has adopted the UNIFORM DIVORCE
RECOGNITION ACT, making proof of domicile in another jurisdiction outside California more
difficult; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
"Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923).
forum."0 Nonetheless, the decision was limited to "the circumstances
of this case." 1 The court of appeals stated:
If in the instant case the judgments of the courts in France disclosed
that the parties were merely sojourning in France at the time the decree
of divorce was granted, or that a residence in France was of such limited
duration as to lead the Supreme Court to believe that the decree was
the result of collusion, or the judgment was rendered for a cause not
recognized as sufficient cause for absolute divorce by the law of this
state, it may be that the justice presiding would be justified in holding
that the decree was contrary to the policy of this state and in a refusal
to give effect to the evidence sought to be established thereby. We leave
those questions open. "2
In 1938, nine years prior to the determinations in Sherrer v.
Sherrer" and Coe v. Coe" (that res judicata barred a spouse who had
participated in litigation from later attacking the decree), the New
York supreme court, special term, in Leviton v. Leviton55 recognized
a Mexican divorce decree where the divorcing spouse had appeared
before the Mexican court and established his domicile as required by
Mexican law," his wife appearing by duly authorized attorney. The
court held that recognition of the Mexican decree would not contra-
vene New York public policy, "even where the ground, the domicile,
or other prerequisites, singly or together, are found to be such that
they would be held insufficient towards securing a New York decree
after a trial taking place here."5 The court's reason for this was that
"establishment of a domicile or residence in the strict sense is a ques-
tion both of intent and act. The parties acted; we must accept the
Mexican court's conclusion upon their intent."5 Thus New York
refrained from applying its own domicile requirement to a foreign
judgment, allowing the determination of domicile in the foreign
forum to be conclusive.
During the next quarter of a century, the New York lower courts
continued to recognize the validity of bilateral Mexican divorces"
"o Rosenstiel v. Rosentiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 91 (1965).
"' Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490, 495 (1923).51ld. at 495.
s Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
54 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).5SLeviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 670, 4
N.Y.S.2d 992 (1938).
51 In discussing the Mexican divorce law, it is inaccurate to speak of Mexican divorce
law as being one uniform throughout Mexico, since Mexico itself is comprised of a federation
of states, each with its own rules for divorce. For further analysis see ALVAREZ, THE
DIVORCE LAWS OF MExIco, Divorce in the Liberal jurisdictions, Marriage and Divorce Sym-
posium (Albrecht ed. 1955); Summers, Divorce Laws of Mexico, 2 LAW & CONTEMv. PROB.
310 (1935). See also note 66 infra.57 Leviton v. Leviton, 255 App. Div. Rep. 230, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (N.Y. 1938).
5s Ibid.
59 See note 79 infra.
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though the highest court in the state, the court of appeals, did not
rule on the matter.
In 1960, however, the so-called "New York Rule""0 found itself
to be on less certain ground than its history would indicate. The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Heine v. Heine,'
reversed a decision by the supreme court, special term, 2 and held that
a bilaterally obtained Mexican divorce (the wife having appeared
personally before the court and the husband having appeared by
attorney) was "of no more validity than a so-called mail-order
divorce."" Although this decision was subsequently reversed," the
supreme court, special and trial term relied on it in Wood v. Wood"5
to deny recognition to another bilateral Mexican divorce decree.
Whereas the divorcing spouse in Heine had proceeded under that
article of Chihuahua law which establishes domicile, the present Mrs.
Wood had proceeded under that article which grants jurisdiction to
the court when the spouses submit to it. " The husband had appeared
through duly authorized attorney. Mrs. Wood's present husband
now attacked the validity of the decree; if invalid the present mar-
riage would be void. The court in Wood held that: "Neither of these
parties ever had even a colorable residence in Mexico and the divorce
decree is patently invalid."" 'When Heine was finally reversed,6 the
60 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 245 (1962).
6' 10 A.D.2d 864, 199 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1960).
62Heine v. Heine, 190 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y. 1959).
63Heine v. Heine, 10 A.D.2d 864, 199 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (1960).
6 4 Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. 1962), afd, 19 A.D.2d 695, 242 N.Y.S.2d
705 (1963).
65 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. 1963).
66In Wood v. Wood, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800, 805 (1963) the court sets out the applicable
Chihuahua Law. Chihuahua courts assume jurisdiction to issue a divorce decree either where
one of the parties shows proof of domicile in Chihuahua (obtained by signing the Municipal
Register and bringing the certificate thereof into court) or where the parties submit them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the court, either expressly or impliedly (by filing of a complaint
by plaintiff or by failure of defendant to object to the competence of the court). The
applicable sections are as follows:
Art. 22: The judge competent to take cognizance of a contested divorce is
the one of the place of residence of the plaintiff; and to take
cognizance of the one by mutual consent, the one of the residence
of either of the spouses.
Art. 23: Competence may also be fixed by express or tacit submission. Ex-
press submission exists when the parties concerned renounce clearly
and conclusively that forum which the law accords to them, and
designate with all precision the judge to whom they submit. Tacit
submission exists by the fact that the plaintiff files his complaint,
or by the fact that the deefndant, after having been summoned in
proper form does not timely raise the lack of competence, or after
having raised it, desists therefrom.
Art. 24: Residence for purposes of Article 22 of the preesnt law shall be
proved by the respective certificates of the Municipal Register of
the place.
67 Wood v. Wood, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800, 810 (N.Y. 1963).
"SHeine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 19 A.D.2d 695, 242 N.Y.S.2d
705 (1963).
Wood case was reargued."' The court upheld its former decision,
distinguishing the Wood case from Heine since: "the foreign court
must have 'jurisdiction' as we understand that term and not as the
foreign court understands it; and I repeat it is not the notice of ap-
pearance that confers jurisdiction."7 Nonetheless, the supreme court,
appellate division, reversed since there was "no valid difference of
substance between this case and Rosenstiel ... decided herewith.""1
As in the Wood case, the present husband in Rosenstiel v. Rosen-
stie " attacked the validity of the Mexican divorce decree allegedly
dissolving his wife's prior marriage. Mrs. Rosenstiel's former husband
had complied with the Mexican domicile requirements of signing the
municipal register and offering his citizen registration as proof of
domicile when he personally petitioned the Mexican court for
divorce.7 The present Mrs. Rosenstiel had appeared through duly
authorized attorney. The supreme court, special and trial term, held
the divorce invalid. 4 The supreme court, appellate division reversed."'
Both the Wood and Rosenstiel decisions were appealed.
III. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel; Wood v. Wood"8
The court of appeals did not differentiate between the Mexican
jurisdictional requirements in Rosenstiel and Wood, but rather, held
that "A balanced public policy now requires that recognition of the
bilateral Mexican divorce be given rather than withheld and such
recognition as a matter of comity offends no public policy of this
state."" After taking a pragmatic view of today's "highly mobile
era"," the court compared the Mexican divorce decree with one
obtained in Nevada after a six weeks' stay and found no intrinsic
difference between the two. Despite the full faith and credit require-
ment for the Nevada decree, one decree did not offend New York
public policy any more than the other.
One of the reasons for the court's decision was
a long series of decisions over a period of a quarter of a century in the
New York Supreme Court at the appellate division and at special term
recognizing the validity of bilateral Mexican divorces which . . . has
69 Wood v. Wood, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. 1963).70 Id at 821.71 Wood v. Wood, 21 A.D.2d 627, 253 N.Y.S.2d 195, 205 (1963).
7243 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1964); 21 A.D.2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206
(1964).
"' See note 66 supra.
74Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1964).
7 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 A.D.2d 635, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1964).
7' Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel; Wood v. Wood, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
7'Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 91 (1965).7 8 id. at 89.
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some relevancy to the question .... No New York decision has refused
to recognize such a bilateral Mexican divorce."
Indeed, the problem of Mexican divorces is particularly acute in New
York; the New York Times has estimated that 200,000 New Yorkers
have obtained divorces from Mexican jurisdictions during these
twenty-five years."s For this reason, both Chief Judge Desmond and
Judge Scileppi, who quite strongly disapprove of the New York
approach and would reverse, would give the reversal only a prospec-
tive application.81
The court of appeals also recognized that by statute New York
will grant a divorce without requiring that the parties have estab-
lished domicile within the state."2 If the spouses were originally mar-
ried in New York or if the plaintiff spouse was a resident of New
York at the time the offense was committed and a resident when he or
she brings the suit for divorce, New York courts will entertain the
suit.
The court of appeals seems also to have based its holding on the
fact that New York's divorce law is grossly inadequate, allowing but
one ground for divorce-adultery. " This legislative shortcoming is
thus, in some measure, apparently being compensated for by liberal
judicial interpretation.
IV. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has never declared that domicile
is the sine qua non of divorce jurisdiction." Until it does, the deci-
sions of state courts must stand as authority for the treatment of
migratory divorces.
When the law concerning foreign divorce decrees began to develop
7 1d ,at 88.
s8 N.Y. Times, Jul 8, 1964, p. 34, col. 2; cited in Note, 29 ALBANY L. REV. 328 (1965)
and in Note, 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 449, 450 (1965).
81Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 92 and 102 (1965) (dissent-
ing opinions).
82Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (1965); see also N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (1964).
8"In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89 (1965), the court re-
jects the argument against recognition of the decree merely because the grounds on which
it was granted were not sufficient under New York law. The dissent however, 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 101, takes issue with the majority, stating that: "The Legislature has seen fit to permit
divorce in this State only because of the adultery of the defendant. . . . This is certainly
indicative of a design to restrict the availability of divorce and in so doing preserve the
family unit." See also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAWS § 170.
84In Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), although the issue of domicile as a
jurisdictional requirement was raised, it was moot by the time it reached the Supreme Court
and no decision was made on it. In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955),
the decision could have been made along these lines, but rested on other grounds. See also
Note, 14 LA. L. REV. 893 (1954).
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in the 1930's, the rules of domestic divorce law were not yet clari-
fied," and the courts, except for New York, applied the traditional
jurisdictional standards in recognizing divorce decrees of foreign
forums through comity. Indeed, this may have been the only logical
approach at that time. But very shortly thereafter the domicile rule,
as it was known, began to disintegrate, especially under the Sherrer"
and Coe8' line of decisions. Although these cases seemingly state the
domicile requirement, they so effectively permit evasion of it that
the need for establishing a domicile has become almost meaningless.
There is thus a discrepancy today in the recognition given a sister-
state divorce and that accorded a foreign decree; the res judicata
principle which enables the divorcing parties to circumvent a true
establishment of domicile in obtaining a "quickie""8 sister-state
divorce is not available in most states to those who obtain a foreign
decree. Furthermore, since the 1930's the United States has undergone
obvious economic and social changes. Her citizens are wealthier and
more mobile." Divorce rules based on a single domicile are even less
applicable today than they were thirty or so years ago.
Although New Jersey as recently as 1964 refused to recognize a
bilaterally granted Mexican divorce," and nine states have adopted
the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act," thereby impeding recogni-
tion of a bilaterally acquired foreign decree, there may be a growing
relaxation of the domicile requirements. Decisions in Florida and
Texas 8 indicate that those states might recognize such decrees. Wheat
v. Wheat" upheld an Arkansas divorce statute which predicates juris-
diction on residence, not domicile. A similar Arkansas decision was
given full faith and credit," and Alaska relied on Wheat when it
upheld an Alaskan serviceman divorce statute." The serviceman's
divorce statutes enacted in eleven states"' establish residence as the
8 See notes 16-19 supra and accompanying text.
sSherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
8 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
88 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 363 (1948).
88See Statistical Abstract of U.S., pp. 32-33 (85th ed. 1964), which breaks down the
mobility status of the population in 1962 and 1963 (as to population, non-movers and
movers); it then compares the mobility status for the years 1950 and 1960, showing that
figures in 1949 indicated 16,476 had a different house in the same county, 9,075 lived in a
different county or abroad; in 1960, the figures were 47,387 and 29,801 respectively.
80See Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53
HARv. L. REV. 68 (1939).
" Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (1963), aff'd, 42 N.J.
287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964).
98See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
"3See note 48 supra.
94229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958).
95 Cummiskey v. Cummiskey, 259 Minn. 427, 107 N.W.2d 864 (1961).
" Lauterbeck v. Lauterbeck, 392 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1964).
97 See note 44 supra.
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